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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-SUPREME COURT DEFINES SCOPE OF
AUTOMOBILE EXCEPTION TO FOURTH AMENDMENT WARRANT RE-
QUIREMENT. United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982).
Acting on information from a reliable informant that an indi-
vidual known as "Bandit" was selling narcotics kept in the trunk of
a car parked at a specified location, the District of Columbia police,
without obtaining a warrant, immediately drove to the location.
Upon arrival, the police ran a license check on the car and found
that the car was registered to Albert Ross. The car and driver fit the
informant's description of the dealer. The officers stopped the car as
it started to leave the area. While two officers searched Ross, the
third noticed a bullet on the front seat, searched the interior of the
car, and found a pistol in the glove compartment. Ross was arrested
and handcuffed. An officer took Ross' keys from the ignition' and
opened the trunk, where he found a closed brown paper bag. The
officer opened the bag and discovered a number of glassine bags
containing a white powder later determined to be heroin. The of-
ficer replaced the bag and drove the car to police headquarters
where another warrantless search of the trunk revealed a zippered
leather pouch containing $3,200 in cash.
Ross was charged with possession of heroin with intent to dis-
tribute.2 A motion to supress the heroin and money was denied, and
Ross was convicted. A three-judge panel of the District of Colum-
bia Court of Appeals reversed the conviction. The court held that
the police had probable cause to stop and search Ross' car, includ-
ing the trunk3 and paper bag, without a warrant, but the warrantless
search of the leather pouch was held invalid.4 The entire court of
appeals voted to rehear the case en banc. On rehearing, the major-
ity5 rejected the three-judge panel's conclusion that a distinction of
constitutional significance existed between the two containers found
I. Brief for Respondent at 9. United States v. Ross, 655 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1981)
(available on LEXIS, General library, Brief file).
2. In violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(A) (1972).
3. The court of appeals panel cited Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925), and
Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970), for authority for the warrantless search of the
automobile, including the trunk.
4. The court of appeals panel cited Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979), for au-
thority that the warrantless search of the paper bag was valid but that the search of the
leather pouch was invalid.
5. The opinion for the court was filed by Circuit Judge Ginsburg, in which Chief
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in respondent's trunk and held that the police should not have
opened either the paper bag or the pouch without first obtaining a
warrant.6
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and re-
versed the decision of the court of appeals. The Supreme Court
held that police officers who have legitimately stopped an automo-
bile and who have probable cause to believe that contraband is con-
cealed somewhere within it may conduct a warrantless search of the
vehicle and its contents, including all containers and packages, as
thoroughly as with an authorized warrant. The Court refused to use
the analysis of previous decisions based upon the type of container
and the expectation of privacy,7 and stated that the proper rule was
that the scope of a warrantless search of an automobile is not de-
fined by the nature of the container in which the contraband is se-
creted, but rather, is defined by the object of the search and the
places in which there is probable cause to believe that it may be
found. United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982).
The fourth amendment to the Constitution of the United States
established the guarantee of freedom from unreasonable searches
and seizures.' However, the adoption of the fourth amendment in
1791 did not immediately affect the methods of search and seizure
then in practice, because its effect was only felt after court decisions
gave it significance. The fourth amendment was not seen as a limi-
tation of searches, but rather a restatement of then existing law.9
Judge McGowan, and Circuit Judges Wright, Robinson, Wald, Mikua and Edwards
concurred.
6. United States v. Ross, 655 F.2d 1159, 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
7. See infra nn.46 to 63 and accompanying text, and J. HALL, SEARCH AND SEIZURE,
13-20 (1982).
8. U.S. CONST. amend. IV provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or Affirmation, and partic-
ularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or things to be seized.
For a review of the background and development of the fourth amendment, see J. HALL,
SEARCH AND SEIZURE 13-20 (1982); W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE 3-6 (1978). See also
Stengle, The Background of the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of The United States,
Part Two, 4 U. RICH. L. REV. 60 (1969). For a review of the background and application of
the exclusionary rule, see W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE 6-20 (1978).
9. Meanwhile Congress, acting in the interim, passed laws permitting searches by cus-
toms officers and Indian agents based on mere suspicion, and the Supreme Court upheld, or
did not take exception to, these statutes. See generally the Act of July 31, 1789, 1 Stat. 29, 43,
Ch. 5 (1789), gave collectors and naval officers power to enter any ship or vessel in which
they had reason to suspect goods or merchandise subject to duty were concealed, and to
search for, seize and secure any goods or merchandise; the Act of April 25, 1808, 2 Stat. 501
[Vol. 6:343
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Not until the latter part of the nineteenth century did the Supreme
Court begin to recognize that the fourth amendment prohibition
against unreasonable search and seizure embodied a substantive
right.' ° To protect this right against unreasonable search and
seizure, a necessary offshoot, the exclusionary rule, began to de-
velop." Under the exclusionary rule, evidence which is seized in
violation of the fourth amendment may not be used against the de-
fendant at trial.' 2
As the law of search and seizure evolved, courts began to recog-
nize that the exigencies of certain situations made it impracticable
(1808), whereby customs officers were empowered to detain any vessel whenever they be-
lieved there existed the intention to violate the embargo provisions; and the Act of May 6,
1822, 3 Stat. 682 (1822), authorizing Indian agents to search the goods of traders upon suspi-
cion and information that ardent spirits were being introduced into the Indian country by
such traders. In Crowell v. M'Fadon, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 94, 97 (1814), the Supreme Court
answered the argument that the officer must show probable cause, by stating that "[t]he law
places a confidence in the opinion of the officer .. " See also American Fur Company v.
United States, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 358, 359 (1829) (in which the Court did not object to the
language of the Statute of 1822 that permitted searches by agents upon suspicion or informa-
tion); Locke v. United States, II U.S. (7 Cranch) 339, 347 (1813) (the Court stated that
probable cause in the case of seizures imports a seizure made under circumstances which
would warrant suspicion); Stengle, The Background of the Fourth Amendment to the Constitu-
tion of the United States, Part Two, 4 U. RicH. L. REV. 60 (1969); and Carroll v. United
States, 267 U.S. 132, 150-53 (1925).
10. Exparte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727 (1877), dealt with postal laws applicable to the in-
spection of unsealed items. The Court held that the fourth amendment constitutional guar-
anty of the right of the people to be secure in their papers against unreasonable searches and
seizures extended to sealed mail and, thus, it could not be opened and searched without a
warrant. Fourth amendment cases before Jackson, which were not of great significance: Ex
parte Burford, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 448 (1806) (fourth amendment covered arrest as well as
search, and an arrest warrant issued without probable cause was invalid); Smith v. Mary-
land, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 71 (1855) (fourth amendment did not protect against searches con-
ducted by state officers); Den v. The Hoboken Land and Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18
How.) 272 (1855) (fourth amendment did not extend to civil proceedings).
11. The first instance of the use of this mechanism to protect fourth amendment rights
was Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), in which the federal government sought the
forfeiture of goods alleged to have been illegally imported, and ordered the production of an
invoice for a portion of the goods. The Court held that under the fourth amendment the
forced production of the invoice was an unreasonable search, and that the order to produce
the invoice and the law which authorized it (Section 5, Act of June 22, 1874, entitled "An
Act to Amend the Customs Revenue Laws; etc., 18 Stat. 186 (1874)) were repugnant to
substantive rights of the fourth and fifth amendments to the Constitution and therefore void.
Thus, the invoice, secured by an unconstitutional search, was held inadmissible in federal
court.
12. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). The Court excluded evidence seized
during a warrantless search of Weeks' home, concluding that materials seized without a
warrant in violation of the fourth amendment will not be admitted into evidence in a federal
criminal trial. It was not until 1961 that the Supreme Court ruled in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.
643 (1961), that the federal exclusionary rule in search and seizure cases was applicable to
the states through the fourteenth amendment due process clause.
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for law enforcement officials to secure warrants before the search.'
3
The courts recognized that warrantless searches and reasonable
searches were not mutually exclusive because the reasonableness of
a search was dependent upon the particular facts of each case.
14
Subsequent case law abandoned the reasonableness standard, how-
ever, in favor of a rule that would hold any search without a warrant
unreasonable per se and thus unconstitutional. 5 Under this new
standard, government officials, in order to avoid the effect of the
exclusionary rule, must show that a warrantless search falls within
one of the few "specifically established and well-delineated"' 6 ex-
ceptions to the fourth amendment warrant requirement. 7
Due to the automobile's predominant role in American society,
the exception to the fourth amendment warrant requirement that
has perhaps had the most pervasive and confusing effect upon the
law of criminal procedure is the automobile exception.' 8 The auto-
13. For instance, the Court recognized that autos could be moved easily, and in the time
it took to get the warrant, the car could be gone. See Katz, Automobile Searches and Dimin-
ished Expectations in the Warrant Clause, 19 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 557, 563-64 (1982).
14. See Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 440 (1973) (reasonableness of search is
factual question); Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 62 (1967) (car search was found not
unreasonable "[u]nder the circumstances of this case."); Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S.
206, 212 (1966) (reasonableness of search dependent upon facts of each case); United States
v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 66 (1950) ("the relevant test is not the reasonableness of procur-
ing a search warrant but whether the search was reasonable"). See also Harris v. United
States, 331 U.S. 145, 150 (1947) (quoting Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S.
344, 357 (1931)).
15. See Robbins v. California, 101 S. Ct. 2841, 2844 (1981), overruled in United States
v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982) (warrantless searches may be per se unreasonable); United
States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 315 (1972) (expressly rejecting the rea-
sonableness-of-the-search test); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 470-71 (1971)
(warrantless search is per se unreasonable unless it falls within a recognized exception);
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969) (if no exceptions to warrant requirement
exist, warrant is necessary); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (stating that
prior approval of magistrate is required or search conducted will be unreasonable per se).
16. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
17. Included among these exceptions were: (1) search incident to lawful arrest, e.g.,
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969); United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950)
(overruled by Chimel); (2) exigent circumstances, e.g., McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S.
451 (1948); (3) a search conducted during hot pursuit of a fleeing felon, e.g., Warden v.
Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967); (4) consent searches, e.g., Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S.
218 (1973); (5) a search of a movable vehicle where probable cause exists to believe that the
vehicle contains contraband or instrumentalities of a crime, e.g., Chambers v. Maroney, 399
U.S. 42 (1970); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925); (6) plain view doctrine, e.g.,
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971); (7) stop and frisk, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1 (1968).
18. Miles and Wefing, The Automobile Search and the Fourth Amendment: A Troubled
Relationship, 4 SETON HALL L. REV. 105 (1972).
The automobile exception is applicable to searches of all types of vehicles, including,
19831 AUTOMOBILE EXCEPTION
mobile exception, established in Carroll v. United States,' 9 allows a
lawful, warrantless search of an automobile that law enforcement
officials have probable cause to believe contains contraband or other
evidence of criminal activity. Carroll dealt with the warrantless
search of an automobile upon probable cause that it contained ille-
gal liquor.2" On review of the defendant's conviction for transport-
ing intoxicating liquor,2' the defendants argued that the warrantless
search and subsequent seizure were in violation of the fourth
amendment22 since the search of the automobile could not be justi-
fied as incident to lawful arrest.23 In upholding the conviction, the
Court stated that if probable cause was present to search, 24 the im-
practicability of obtaining a warrant and the possibility that the con-
traband might be removed or destroyed combined to make the
search reasonable.
25
for example, vans, campers, trailers attached to automobiles, trucks, tractor trailers, tractors,
boats and airplanes. J. HALL, SEARCH AND SEIZURE 264, n.l (1982).
19. 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
20. In Carroll federal prohibition agents received evidence that the defendants were
bootleggers who frequently traveled a certain highway and stopped Carroll's roadster on the
highway to check it for liquor. The warrantless search of the car revealed no liquor until an
officer, noticing the seat cushion to be harder than usual, tore open the cushion and found
sixty-eight bottles of gin and whiskey concealed inside. Id. at 135, 136.
21. Id. at 154. This was a violation of the National Prohibition Act in which Congress
had statutorily authorized federal agents to search, without a warrant, movable vehicles sus-
pected of carrying contraband spirits. Ch. 85, tit. II, § 26, 41 Stat. 315 (1919) (repealed
1935).
22. Carrol, 267 U.S. at 158.
23. "The right to search and the validity of the seizure are not dependent on the right to
arrest. They are dependent on the reasonable cause the seizing officer has for belief that the
contents of the automobile offend against the law." .d. at 158-59.
24. The Court found that the officers had probable cause to search because "the facts
and circumstances within their knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy
information were sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the
belief that intoxicating liquor was being transported in the automobile which they stopped
and searched." Id. at 162.
25. Chief Justice Taft held:
On reason and authority the true rule is that if the search and seizure without a
warrant are made upon probable cause, that is, upon a belief, reasonably arising
out of circumstances known to the seizing officer, that an automobile or other vehi-
cle contains that which by law is subject to seizure and destruction, the search and
seizure are valid. The Fourth Amendment is to be construed in the light of what
was deemed an unreasonable search and seizure when it was adopted, and in a
manner which will conserve public interests as well as the interests and rights of
individual citizens.
Id. at 149. In explaining the basis for this rule, the Carroll Court noted that, historically,
warrantless searches of vessels, wagons and carriages-as opposed to fixed premises such as
a home-had been treated differently by Congress. The movability of vehicles can give rise
to more exigent circumstances to search without a warrant. 1d. at 153. See also Steagald v.
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While Carroll was frequently relied upon in the enforcement of
prohibition laws2 6 as an exception to the warrant requirement, the
Carroll doctrine was for the most part neglected because of an over-
lap with the Weeks 27 search incident to arrest exception.28  Fre-
quently the same probable cause that points to a particular
automobile or a likely container also points to the criminality of its
owner, driver or passenger. Therefore, auto searches based upon
probable cause that the occupants were violating the law were not
challenged under Carroll because of the Weeks effect. In early
stages of the Carroll doctrine the scope of searches incident to arrest
was quite broad.29 During that time, since a lawful arrest gave rise
automatically to an incidental search of an entire premises, it fol-
lowed that when the underlying arrest occurred in or near a vehicle,
it gave rise automatically to a search of the entire vehicle.30 This
would be true even though the police lacked probable cause to be-
lieve the vehicle contained contraband or evidence. 3' However,
when the Supreme Court reduced the search incident to arrest pe-
rimeter in Chimel v. California32 to a point where it did not necessar-
ily extend to all parts of a vehicle,33 it became necessary to look
more carefully at the Carroll probable cause search.34
United States, 451 U.S. 204, 211 (1981) (referring to houses only); Chambers v. Maroney,
399 U.S. 42, 48 (1970) (referring to vehicles).
26. See e.g., Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949); Scher v. United States, 305
U.S. 251 (1938); Husty v. United States, 282 U.S. 694 (1931).
27. The search incident to lawful arrest exception, first recognized in Weeks v. United
States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914), gave law enforcement officers the right to search the person
who is the subject of a full custodial arrest. The Supreme Court later expanded the scope of
searches incident to arrest in Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947). The Harris Court
sustained an intensive search of the arrestee's apartment by reasoning that the arrestee was
in exclusive possession of his apartment and that his control extended as much to the bed-
room where the draft cards were found as to the living room where he was arrested. United
States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950), sustained an intensive search of an office and
papers incident to an arrest. Warrantless searches of automoblies were almost always justi-
fied as being incident to the lawful arrest of the drivers and occupants of the vehicles. Both
Harris and Rabinowitz were overruled by Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969). See
Moylan, The Automobile Exception: What Its And What It Is Not-A Rationale In Search
Of A Clearer Label, 27 MERCER L. REV. 987, 1000 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Moylan].
28. See Moylan, supra note 27, at 1000.
29. See supra note 27.
30. See Moylan, supra note 27, at 1000.
31. See supra note 27.
32. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
33. The scope of the search was limited to that area within the immediate control of the
arrestee; "[T]he area from within which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructi-
ble evidence." Id. at 763.
34. See supra note 23, at 1001.
[Vol. 6:343348
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Within a year after Chimel, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the
Carroll doctrine in Chambers v. Maroney35 and extended the auto-
mobile exception to cover the warrantless search of an automobile
after police had moved it to the station.36 The Chambers Court held
that, if officers had probable cause to search the automobile at the
time it was stopped as Carroll said they did, then-the probable cause
extended to a subsequent warrantless search of the automobile at
the police station.37 The Court also found no constitutional differ-
ence between seizing and holding a car before a presentation of the
probable cause issue to a magistrate and carrying out an immediate
search without a warrant.38
The Chambers Court, in keeping with Carroll, tied the warrant-
less search to the sudden development of probable cause and the
exigencies of a mobile vehicle. However, according to dicta in later
Supreme Court decisions,39 Chambers indicated that mobility alone
could not justify the exception since the officers had impounded the
car prior to searching it. These later decisions based their validation
of Chambers upon a lesser expectation of privacy4° in an automo-
35. 399 U.S. 42 (1970).
36. Id. at 52. After the defendants' arrest, their automobile was towed to police head-
quarters and seached without a warrant. Id. at 44. Evidence obtained in the search was
admitted under the Carroll exception even though it would not have been admitted under
the search incident to arrest exception of Weeks. Id. at 46-48. The Court added that here
there was probable cause and that when a vehicle is involved probable cause must always be
present under Carroll. Id. at 47-51. The Court was careful to point out, however, that the
Carroll exception to a search warrant was a special circumstance. "[Generally], it has also
required the judgment of a magistrate on the probable-cause issue and the issuance of a
warrant before a search is made. Only in exigent circumstances will the judgment of the
police as to probable cause serve as a sufficient authorization for a search." Id. at 51.
37. Id. at 52. "The probable cause factor still obtained at the station house and so did
the mobility of the car." 1d. The Court reasoned that the search of the automobile at the
time of the stop may at times be impractical and unsafe for the officers. Id. at 52 n. 10.
38. Id. at 51, 52. The Supreme Court curtailed Chambers somewhat in Coolidge v.
New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971). The Court in Coolidge held that if there was no real
possibility that the automobile was going to be moved and the police had ample opportunity
to obtain a warrant, then the necessary exigent circumstances of Carroll and Chambers did
not exist and the police should have obtained a warrant. Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 462.
39. Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583 (1974); Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S.
266 (1973).
40. See, e.g., Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973) (Powell, J., con-
curring). "The search of an automobile is far less intrusive on the rights protected by the
Fourth Amendment than the search of one's person or of a building." Id. at 279. See also
Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583 (1974), in which the Court stated:
One has a lesser expectation of privacy in a motor vehicle because its function is
transportation and it seldom serves as one's residence or as the repository of per-
sonal effects. A car has little capacity for escaping public scrutiny. It travels public
thoroughfares where its occupants and its contents are in plain view. 'What a per-
350 UALR LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 6:343
bile. Later, in support of this lower expectation of privacy analysis,
United States v. Chadwick4' and Arkansas v. Sanders42 both pointed
out that potential mobility was not always present when the war-
rantless search of an automobile occurred and that an officer could
search an automobile without a warrant in situations which would
require a warrant to search a house. Therefore, the lesser expecta-
tions of privacy4 in the automobile as compared to the home had
emerged as another justification for the automobile exception.
Although not an automobile exception case, Chadwick was the
first Supreme Court case to apply the expectation of privacy ration-
ale to containers located inside a car. 4 The government did not
argue that the Carroll doctrine applied in Chadwick, but rather that
the mobility rationale of the Carroll doctrine should be extended to
easily movable objects. 4  The Court rejected this argument and
stated that they recognized significant differences between
automobiles and luggage. 46 The majority noted that inherent mo-
bility was not the only justification for the automobile exception be-
cause the Court had sustained warrantless searches of immobile
son knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a sub-
ject of fourth amendment protection.' Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. at 351 (1967)
. . . This is not to say that no part of the interior of an automobile has Fourth
Amendment protection; the exercise of a desire to be mobile does not, of course,
waive one's right to be free of unreaonable government intrusion. But insofar as
Fourth Amendment protection extends to a motor vehicle, it is the right to privacy
that is the touchstone of our inquiry.
Cardwell, 417 U.S. at 590-91.
41. 433 U.S. 1 (1977).
42. 442 U.S. 753 (1979).
43. In Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), the Court recognized that the fourth
amendment protects a person's "reasonable expectation of privacy" associated with the area
or object searched. The Katz Court held that the warrantless wiretapping of a phone booth
was unconstitutional because the petitioner had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his
telephone conversation. The search violated this expectation and was therefore invalid. Id.
at 352-53.
44. In Chadwick federal agents had probable cause to believe the defendant's footlocker
contained marijuana two days before the footlocker arrived on a train. On arrival, the
agents waited until the defendants put the footlocker in their car before arresting them. An
hour and a half after taking the car and footlocker to the federal building, the agents
searched the footlocker without a warrant. 433 U.S. at 3-5. Prior to Chadwick the Court
had noted that there was a diminished expectation of privacy where automobiles were con-
cerned. Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590-91 (1974) (scraping paint from the outside of a
murder suspect's car, without a warrant, did not violate the fourth amendment.)
45. Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 11-12.
46. Id. at 12-13. The Court distinguished luggage from cars. The differences are that
luggage contents are not open to public view, nor subject to regular inspections and official
scrutiny. The primary function of luggage is as a repository of personal effects. Id. at 13.
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vehicles.47 The lesser expectation of privacy that exists in
automobiles also justified the exception.48 Chief Justice Burger
found that this lesser expectation did not apply to luggage and in-
validated the search.49
After the Chadwick case, much confusion remained among the
courts concerning the scope of that holding as applied to searches of
luggage found within moving vehicles lawfully detained by police
officers.5 ° The Supreme Court confronted this issue in Arkansas v.
Sanders."' In Sanders the state relied directly on the Carroll auto-
mobile exception to justify the warrantless search of a closed suit-
case believed to contain contraband which was seized from the
trunk of a cab. 52 The Supreme Court rejected the state's argument
but did consider Sanders as an automobile exception search.53 The
plurality then applied Chadwick, which was not an automobile ex-
ception case, and refused to extend the automobile exception to the
warrantless search of one's personal luggage merely because it was
located in an automobile lawfully stopped by the police.54 The
47. Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 12. The Court cited South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S.
364, 367 (1976); Texas v. White, 423 U.S. 67 (1975); Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433,
441-42 (1973); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970); and Cooper v. California, 386 U.S.
58 (1967).
48. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1977). The Court relied on Cardwell
v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583 (1974) (plurality decision). See supra note 42.
49. Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 12-13.
50. See, e.g., United States v. Stevie, 582 F.2d 1175, 1178-79 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. de-
nied, 443 U.S. 911 (1979) (individual's expectation of privacy in luggage, found within an
automobile's trunk is entitled to fourth amendment protection). See also United States v.
Finnegan, 568 F.2d 637, 641 (9th Cir. 1977) (distinguished Chadwick, and held the warrant-
less search of luggage in a trunk was constitutional).
51. 442 U.S. 753 (1979). The Court specifically granted certiorari to resolve doubts re-
garding the scope of the Chadwick decision. Id. at 754.
52. Id. at 761.
53. Id. at 764-65.
54. Id. The plurality reasoned that, since luggage is a common repository for one's
personal effects and therefore inevitably associated with the expectation of privacy, a suit-
case taken from an automobile stopped on the highway is not necessarily attended by any
lesser expectation of privacy than is associated with luggage taken from other locations. Id.
at 761-66. Chief Justice Burger and Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment but argued
that this was not an automobile exception search because the police had probable cause to
search the suitcase before it was put into the taxi and no probable cause to search the taxi
itself. It was argued that this case did not present the question of whether a warrant was
required before opening luggage when police had probable cause to believe contraband was
located somewhere in the vehicle but were not aware of its location. The concurring judges
considered that it would be better to await a case in which the question must be decided. Id.
at 766-69 (Burger, C. J., concurring). Justice Blackmun and Justice Rehnquist would have
upheld the suitcase search under the automobile exception. Id. at 769 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
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Court in Sanders did indicate that a warrantless search of some con-
tainers would be permitted because of the diminished expectation of
privacy associated with the container.15 This led to confusion of the
courts in subsequent decisions on the issue of which receptacles
could support a legitimate expectation of privacy interest.5 6 In Rob-
bins v. California 57 the Supreme Court attempted to resolve this is-
sue and redefine the constitutional scope of warrantless searches of
containers found during a lawful automobile search.
The facts of Robbins closely resembled the facts in Carroll and
Chambers and therefore supported a finding of exigent circum-
stances since the probable cause developed suddenly.58 By contrast,
in Chadwick and Sanders the officers had prior knowledge of the
suspects' arrival, and they had ample time to obtain a warrant.
Also, in Robbins the suspicion of the police was directed toward the
automobile itself, whereas in Chadwick and Sanders the suspicion of
the police was directed at specific containers. 59 However, the plural-
ity in Robbins chose to apply the dicta of the Chadwick and Sanders
container cases and extended them to the warrantless search under
the automobile exception. 60 The decision had the effect of further
55. Id. at 764-65 n.13.
56. See, e.g., United States v. McGrath, 613 F.2d 361 (2d Cir. 1979) (search of card-
board boxes valid); United States v. Dien, 609 F.2d 1038 (2d Cir. 1979), aff'd on rehearing,
615 F.2d 10 (2d Cir. 1980) (search of cardboard boxes invalid); United States v. Rivera, 486
F. Supp. 1025 (N.D. Tex. 1980), aff'd, 654 F.2d 1048 (5th Cir. 1981) (warrantless searches of
garbage bags are invalid); People v. Pace, 92 Cal. App., 3d 199, 154 Cal. Rptr. 811 (1979)
(search of lunchbox invalid); Evans v. State, 368 So.2d 58 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (war-
rantless search of garbage bag valid); State v. Schrier, 283 N.W.2d 338 (Iowa 1979) (warrant-
less search of unlatched knapsack valid); Cooper v. Commonwealth, 577 S.W.2d 34 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1979) (search of taped electric razor case valid); Pirner v. State, 45 Md. App. 50, 411
A.2d 135 (1980) (warrantless search of duffel bag invalid).
57. 453 U.S. 420 (1980).
58. See supra notes 20, 36 and accompanying text.
59. See supra notes 44, 53, 55 and accompanying text.
60. The plurality held that all containers are equally protected by the fourth amend-
ment unless their contents are in plain view or are obvious to an observer because of the
appearance of the container; therefore, in light of Chadwick and Sanders, the warrantless
search was impermissible. 453 U.S. at 426-29. Justice Powell, concurring in the judgment,
noted that there was "some justice" in the dissent's argument that the automobile exception
should control a search of containers when probable cause exists to search the automobile,
as opposed to probable cause focused on a particular item therein. Id. at 435. The position
taken by all three dissenting Justices was that the automobile exception should be extended
to encompass any items found inside an automobile. Id. at 436-37, 439-42, 444-49. Justice
Stevens, dissenting, argued that neither Sanders nor Chadwick precluded application of the
automobile exception because neither case truly involved the automobile exception. Id. at
445-46. Justice Blackmun, dissenting, also argued that it would have been better for the
Court to adopt a "clear-cut" rule that a warrant should not be required to seize and search
personal property found in an automobile. Id. at 436.
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confusing this area of fourth amendment law.
The conflict of opinion in Robbins and the conviction that clari-
fication was feasible in this area of the law led the Court to grant
certiorari in Ross v. United States6 and address the question of
whether the decision in Robbins should be reconsidered. 62 The
Court in Ross squarely addressed the issue of whether the Carroll
automobile exception or the warrant requirement of container cases
controlled the search of a container discovered during the legitimate
warrantless search of an automobile.63 A plurality64 stated that the
answer is determined by the scope of the search authorized by the
automobile exception set forth in Carroll. The Court, in reversing
and remanding the appellate court's decision, held that police of-
ficers who had legitimately stopped an automobile and who had
probable cause to believe that contraband was concealed some-
where within it, could conduct a warrantless search of the vehicle
and its contents, including all containers and packages, as thor-
oughly as if a magistrate had authorized the search with a warrant.
65
The Court began with a review of the Carroll decision, upon
which it relied heavily. The Court noted that the exception to the
warrant requirement established in Carroll applied only to searches
of vehicles based on probable cause. The plurality argued that the
rationale justifying a warrantless search of an automobile believed
to be carrying contraband applies with equal force to any movable
container which might also contain the contraband.66 However, the
Court noted that the same argument was rejected in United States v.
Chadwick and Arkansas v. Sanders. Justice Stevens, writing for the
plurality, then distinguished both cases from Ross by stating that
they were container search cases and not automobile search cases.67
The officers in Chadwick and Sanders had probable cause to search
the containers before they were placed in the cars.68
61. 456 U.S. 798.
62. Id. at 803-04.
63. In Ross the officers had probable cause to stop the vehicle. The automobile excep-
tion validated the search of the car.
64. The plurality consisted of Chief Justice Burger and Justices Rehnquist, Stevens and
O'Connor. Justice Blackmun and Justice Powell filed concurring opinions. Justice White
dissented and filed an opinion. Justice Marshall dissented and filed an opinion in which
Justice Brennan joined.
65. 456 U.S. at 823.
66. Id. at 804-09.
67. Id. at 810-14. "[I]n neither Chadwick nor Sanders did the police have probable
cause to search the entire vehicle or anything within it except the footlocker in the former
case and the green suitcase in the latter." Id. at 814.
68. Id. at 813. "Here [in Sanders], as in Chadwick, it was the luggage being transported
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Justice Stevens reviewed that part of Robbins v. California
which was relevant to the question in Ross; namely, what should
have been the scope of the automobile exception to the warrant re-
quirement. In United States v. Ross, unlike Robbins, the Court
squarely addressed the question whether, in the course of a legiti-
mate warrantless search of an automobile, police are entitled to
open containers found within the vehicle. And, unlike Chadwick
and Sanders, the police in Ross had probable cause to search Ross'
entire vehicle.69
The Court reasoned that refusing to extend the scope of Carroll
and Chambers to secondary containers found within the car would
be illogical.70 In fact, prior to the decisions in Chadwick and Sand-
ers, courts routinely had held that containers and packages found
during a legitimate warrantless search of an automobile also could
be searched without a warrant.7
The Court stated that a warrant to search a vehicle would sup-
port a search of every part of the vehicle that might contain the
object of the search. The individual's expectation of privacy must
give way to the magistrate's official determination of probable
cause.72 Therefore, if an officer is given that same probable cause to
believe the vehicle is transporting contraband, the individual's pri-
vacy interests again must yield to the authority of a search which, in
light of Carroll, does not require the prior approval of a magis-
trate.73 The Court reasoned that the scope of a warrantless search of
an automobile is not defined by the nature of the container in which
the contraband is secreted, but by the object of the search and the
places in which there is probable cause to believe that object may be
found.14 Justice Stevens then concluded that the Carroll "automo-
by the respondent at the time of the arrest, not the automobile in which it was being carried,
that was the suspected locus of the contraband. The relationship between the automobile
and the contraband was purely coincidental, as in Chadwick." Id. at 813.
69. Id. at 817.
70. Id. at 818. The Court noted in its application of Carroll that the Supreme Court in
fact has sustained warrantless searches of containers found during a lawful search of an
automobile. E.g., Scher v. United States, 305 U.S. 251 (1938); Husty v. United States, 282
U.S. 694 (1931). See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
71. 456 U.S. at 818-19. The Court cited several cases in support of this. Id. at 819 n.25.
72. Id. at 820-21.
73. Id. at 823. "The scope of a warrantless search based on probable cause is no nar-
rower-and no broader-than the scope of a search authorized by a warrant supported by
probable cause. Only theprior approval of the magistrate is wavied; the search otherwise is as
the magistrate could authorize." Id. (emphasis added).
74. Id. at 824. "Just as probable cause to believe that a stolen lawnmower may be
found in a garage will not support a warrant to search an upstairs bedroom, probable cause
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bile exception" is unquestionably one of the few specific exceptions
to the general warrant requirement of the fourth amendment."
In separate concurring opinions, Justices Blackmun and Powell
agreed with the plurality in Ross and, after expressing their discom-
fort at recent prior holdings in auto search cases, recognized the im-
portance of Justice Stevens' opinion in establishing an authoritative
ruling that should clarify much of the confusion existing in automo-
bile search cases.7 6 Justice Powell noted that, given the Carroll and
Chambers decisions, the plurality decision in Ross does not depart
substantially from fourth amendment doctrine in automobile
cases.
77
The dissenting Justices78 stated that the plurality, by equating a
police officer's estimation of probable cause with a magistrate's, re-
peals all realistic limits on warrantless searches and the fourth
amendment warrant requirement itself.79 They argued that the plu-
rality's assumption that the scope of the automobile exception was
as broad as the "lawful" automobile search authorized by a magis-
trate has never been the law. Moreover, the dissenters stated, the
assumption is contrary to previous Supreme Court cases which es-
tablished that an on-the-spot determination of probable cause is
never the same as a decision by a neutral and detached magistrate.80
Finally, the dissenting Justices predicted that the Court's decision
will have unworkable consequences because police must walk the
thin line between having sufficient knowledge .to establish probable
cause and insufficient knowledge to know exactly where the contra-
band is located.8' The dissenters concluded by stating that the only
convincing explanation for the plurality's broad ruling is the expedi-
ency of the search and that expediency, by itself, can never justify
disregard of the fourth amendment.
8 2
In the past decade fourth amendment litigation has consumed
to believe that undocumented aliens are being transported in a van will not justify a war-
rantless search of a suitcase. Probable cause to believe that a container placed in the trunk
of a taxi contains contraband or evidence does not justify a search of the entire cab." Id.
75. Id. See supra note 36.
76. Id. at 825 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
77. Id. at 826 (Powell, J., concurring).
78. See supra note 65.
79. 456 U.S. at 827 (Marshall, J. and Brennan, J., dissenting).
80. Id. at 832-33. Justice Marshall states that, in light of the decisions in Chadwick,
Sanders, and Robbins, any movable container found within an automobile deserves the
same fourth amendment warrant protection that it would deserve if found at a location
outside the automobile. Id. at 834.
81. Id. at 840.
82. Id. at 842. The dissent quotes Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393 (1978): "the
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too much of the Supreme Court's limited time.83 During this period
the Court has been unsuccessful in producing a clear and consistent
rule governing the search of containers in automobiles which may
be readily applied by the police and the courts. 84 Finally, that time
has come. The plurality in Ross has now accomplished an authori-
tative ruling which should clarify much of the confusion in this
troubled area of the law. The decision makes it clear that when
police officers have probable cause to believe that a vehicle is trans-
porting contraband, they may conduct a warrantless search of every
part of the vehicle and its contents, including all containers and
packages, which might conceal the object of the search. Further-
more, the decision will probably have substantial precedential value
in future fourth amendment cases. The most unsettling aspect of the
Ross opinion is that the consequences of the application of this rule
by officers in the field could vary from simply opening a container
in one's car to literally ripping it apart in the search of contraband.
The officer must remember that in making this probable cause
determination he may not rely on subjective good faith, but must
have knowledge of objective facts that could justify the issuance of a
warrant by a magistrate. Therefore, since the door is now appar-
ently closed on the argument that a warrant is needed to search a
container found within an automobile during its lawful probable
cause search,85 the new issue for determination will be the evalua-
tion of an officer's decision about probable cause.
Michael Schneider
mere fact that law enforcement may be made more efficient can never by itself justify disre-
gard of the fourth amendment." Id.
83. 2 W. LAFAVE. SEARCH AND SEIZURE (1978).
84. 456 U.S. at 817.
85. United States v. Floyd, 681 F.2d 265 (5th Cir. 1982) (held that where police had
probable cause to believe defendants' vehicle was transporting contraband, the warrantless
opening of containers in that trunk was valid due to the intervening decison of United States
v. Ross). Rodriquez v. State, No. 81-497 (Supreme Ct. of Minn. July 30, 1982) (LEXIS)
(court relied on Ross to hold that where police had probable cause to search defendants'
trunk, no warrant was needed to search either the trunk or the paper bag found inside the
trunk).
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